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Abstract In a recent Analysis piece, John Shand (2014) argues that the Predictive Theory of Mind 
provides a unique explanation for why one cannot play chess against oneself. Based on this 
purported explanatory power, Shand concludes that we have an extra reason to believe that PTM is 
correct. In this reply, we firstly rectify the claim that one cannot play chess against oneself; then we 
move on to argue that even if this were the case, Shand’s argument does not give extra weight to the 
Predictive Theory of Mind.
Keywords: Predictive theory of mind; Chess; Explanatory power; Inference to the best explanation
In a recent Analysis piece, John Shand (2014) argues that the Predictive Theory of Mind (PTM, 
henceforth) “neatly explains why one cannot play chess against oneself” (p. 5). Based on this 
purported explanatory power, Shand draws an inference to the best explanation to conclude that we 
have an extra reason to believe that PTM is correct.
In what follows, we firstly rectify the claim that one cannot play chess against oneself; then 
we move on to argue that even if this were the case, Shand’s inference does not give extra weight to 
PTM. We note that our conclusions can be generalized to other cognitive phenomena.
According to Shand, it is impossible to play chess against oneself because “uncertainty of 
what one’s opponent will do, and the subsequent positions, are essential to playing the game” (p. 5),
and in self-play one cannot be uncertain about one’s own next moves: “while thinking of one’s own 
move it is simply impossible not to know what one is very likely going to do in reply to it” (p. 4). 
Thus, chess is essentially represented as a prediction game in Shand’s argument: “Chess is about 
thought battling uncertainty and the millions of possible permutations and variations in, and 
extending from, the positions chess involves” (Ibid.).
First, we observe that many chess players, including grandmasters as well as one of the 
authors of this reply, do sometimes play against themselves. The famous grandmaster and vice 
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world Champion David Bronstein (1924-2006) even played a beautiful game against himself while 
sleeping, becoming famous as “Bronstein’s Dream Game” (see Appendix). This game also has 
some significance from the point of view of chess opening theory. But Shand (2014) dismisses these
cases as irrelevant by noting that, there should be more to a game of chess than to moving the pieces
according to the rules of chess (p. 3).
This claim brings us to the psychology of chess. If the argument for why you cannot play 
chess against yourself is that no predictions about what “your opponent” is going to do affect 
self-play (since there is no uncertainty about one’s own moves), and predictions about the other’s 
moves are necessary for playing chess, then psychological evidence offers thin grounds to conclude 
that self-play is impossible.
There are several kinds of cognitive processes that can be involved in playing a game of 
chess—including problem-solving, acquiring and retaining in memory a large number of patterns of
chess configurations, chunks and templates, pattern-recognition, quick pattern-retrieval, evaluation, 
counterfactual thinking, and, of course, look-ahead search and anticipation of the opponent’s most 
likely moves (cf. Chase and Simon 1973; Holding 1992; Gobet and Charness 2006). According to 
some prominent theories (Chase and Simon, 1973; Gobet and Simon 1996; Saariluoma 1995), chess
expertise taps most crucially onto quick and reliable recognition of valuable board configurations; 
processes such as search, calculation of variations, and brute-force prediction of the opponent’s 
most likely next moves play a far less important role. Interestingly, this fact neatly distinguishes 
human from computer chess players. As recalled by the Russian chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov,
“correctly evaluating a small handful of moves is far more important in human chess, and human 
decision-making in general, than the systematically deeper and deeper search for better moves—the 
number of moves ‘seen ahead’—that computers rely on” (2010). Such evaluations include the 
understanding of pawn structures, the recognition of “harmonious” piece configurations and the 
intuitive decision-making that is typical of blitz games (five minutes per player and game). If this is 
correct, then there is little justification for the belief that predictive skills are necessarily engaged in 
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all instances of chess playing, even at the expert level. But if this belief is unjustified, then Shand’s 
argument for why one cannot play chess against oneself rests on thin grounds.
Games against oneself are not only psychological possible, but also non-trivial in various 
ways. Playing White, I may face a difficult strategic choice (e.g., between two different pawn 
structures), while playing Black, my moves happen to be more or less forced. The predictive 
dimension of games against oneself need not be trivial (or non-existent) either. Playing White, I 
spot a sequence of forced moves, which appears favourable to me. However, my judgment may 
have been mistaken: the judgment of the final position was too optimistic, or I might have 
overlooked a forceful reply for Black somewhere in the combination. Only when the forced moves 
are executed, that possibility transpires to both White and Black because they are now in a better 
position to visualize the mutual opportunities and the final position. Such phenomena occur 
regularly in self-play and in tournament games between two players (Krogius 1983).
These considerations put pressure on Shand’s claim that one cannot play chess against 
oneself. Of course, some games between two players could not occur when one player is battling 
oneself. Neither do we claim that there is no meaningful difference between real and imagined 
games. But this does not imply that playing chess against oneself is absurd or psychologically 
impossible. Our conclusions can be easily transferred to other games with complete information, 
such as Go, checkers or backgammon.1
Now, in the second part of this reply, we show that even if Shand were correct about the 
crucial skills in chess-playing, the purported inability of playing chess against oneself could be 
explained in different ways.
1  In computer programming, reinforcement learning from self-play is one of the most 
interesting approaches for studying and training computer programs that can play complex board 
games—including Go, backgammon, checkers and chess. In this approach, the program plays many
games against itself, keeps track of sequences of board positions starting at the opening position, 
and uses a reward signal obtained at the end of each game to improve the quality of its move 
decisions in subsequent games. Although self-play is a time-consuming learning approach, where it 
may be relatively hard to detect which moves are bad, it can lead to the same level of performance 
of expert human players (cf. Samuel 1959; Tesauro 1994; Thrun 1995).
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Generally, explanations of why a certain kind of system cannot produce a certain cognitive 
phenomenon should provide us with information about what cognitive resources the phenomenon in
question recruits, and why the system lacks, or is unable to deploy, those resources. Specifically, 
explanations of why human agents cannot play chess against themselves should provide us with 
pieces of information about what cognitive resources chess self-play recruits and why the human 
cognitive system lacks, or is unable to deploy, those resources.
In order to explain the inability to play chess with oneself, Shand (2014) firstly sketches a 
very general theory of brains, cognition, and life indeed, viz. what he calls “the Predictive Theory of
Mind.” He then describes chess-playing in terms of general concepts of this theory. Finally, he tries 
to show why it is absurd to apply the same concepts to characterise self-playing in chess. Thus, our 
inability to play chess against ourselves would rest explained, and we would have an extra reason to
believe that the PTM is correct, or so Shand claims.
What is the PTM? And to which claims is it committed? The PTM is most closely associated
with recent work by Karl Friston (2010), Jacob Hohwy (2013) and Andy Clark (2013). The basic 
commitments of the PTM are twofold: first, brains are kinds of prediction machines; second, brains 
produce cognitive phenomena, including perception and action, by constantly attempting to 
minimize prediction errors.2 Prediction errors quantify the discrepancy between predictions about 
the value of a certain variable and the observed value of the variable (Niv and Schoenbaum 2008). 
In the PTM, prediction errors quantify the mismatch between expected and actual sensory input. 
Specifically, according to the PTM, the brain would encode models of the causal structure of the 
world. Based on these models, it attempts to predict its sensory inputs. If the brains’ predictions 
about sensory signals are not met, then a prediction error is generated, which will tune the brains’ 
models of the causal structure of the world so as to reduce the discrepancy between what was 
2  It is not obvious what the explanatory scope of the PTM is. Shand (2014) suggests that any 
cognitive phenomena can be accounted by the PTM when he writes that “the brain in encountering 
chess is only doing what it does when dealing with any experiences and determining how to act” (p.
4, emphasis added).
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expected and what actually obtained. Friston, Hohwy and Clark agree on these two basic tenets, as 
well as on how these tenets can be most properly fleshed out in technical terms borrowed from 
information theory and statistics, viz. in terms of free-energy, Bayesian inference, and hierarchical 
predictive coding. Despite this agreement—it should be noted—Friston’s Hohwy’s and Clark’s 
formulations of the PTM are not equivalent, and the consequences they draw from it are different.
Shand conceives of chess-playing as a prediction game where, if you played against 
yourself, your brain’s model of the game could not possibly make mistaken predictions about the 
next configuration. No uncertainty would need be minimized, as no uncertainty would be involved 
in predicting your “opponent’s” moves. No surprises would be involved. No prediction errors; no 
game of chess could be played.
It should be apparent that there is no claim specific to chess in this explanation, besides the 
assumption that genuinely playing chess requires some uncertainty about the next move of one’s 
opponent. Surely, the information-theoretic and statistical concepts embedded in the PTM provide 
us with one possible quantitative, encompassing, framework whereby we can describe and study 
behaviour and cognition. However, it is far from clear how such description would explain or 
provide understanding on particular kinds of adaptive processes, cognitive phenomena and 
behaviours. Within the PTM, ‘prediction’ ‘expectation’ and ‘surprise’ are information-theoretic 
notions that should be neatly distinguished from the corresponding psychological concepts that we 
ordinarily employ to pick out personal-level mental states and explain particular behaviours. 
Furthermore, describing any cognitive phenomena in terms of the information-theoretic and 
statistical notions embedded in the PTM affords a kind of unification that is not obviously 
explanatory (Colombo and Hartmann ms).
Although Shand claims that “it is hard to see [the inability to play chess] explained in any 
other way” (p. 5), there are alternative frameworks where the target-explanandum can be described, 
studied and possibly explained. Alternative frameworks that readily come to mind include game 
theory and reinforcement learning (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, Sec. 15.7; Sutton and 
5
Barto 1998; see also Shannon 1950). Here is one possible sketchy explanation of why humans are 
allegedly unable to play chess against themselves, cashed out in terms of game theory and 
reinforcement learning.
One basic model of chess is that of a Tree Search problem, where each state is a particular 
board configuration and the available actions correspond to the legal moves available to a player at 
a certain time. Looking forward to the end of the game and apply backward induction to find a 
solution is intractable. A player needs an evaluation function which takes as input the current state 
of the game and outputs an estimate of the goodness of that state. As the ordinary goal of a game of 
chess is to win the game, the goodness of a state is defined in terms of the expectation (or 
likelihood) to win the game making some move from that position. Given an evaluation, the player 
needs to rely on action-selection policy or some heuristic to decide which move to take.
Now, one possible explanation for why, in some sense, you cannot play chess against 
yourself is that in self-play your evaluation function will define a goal different from the ordinary 
one of winning the game. If you and I play chess against one another, our evaluation functions will 
define our goal, which, ordinarily, is to win the game. During the game, we shall make our moves 
so as to maximize our likelihood to win the game, thereby reaching our goal. If you play against 
yourself, your evaluation function could differ, leading to different implicit goals. You may just aim 
at exploring certain branches of the Tree, for example those that lead to bizarre, sharp or exciting 
positions. But if your evaluation function defines a goal that is not to win the game, then, in some 
sense, you are not playing a game of chess at all. That’s why, in some sense, you cannot play chess 
against yourself.
The point of this sketchy explanation is to show that there are alternative frameworks, 
whereby the target phenomenon (i.e. the inability to play chess against oneself) can be described, 
studied, and possibly explained. Shand’s inference to the best (or only) explanation, which he takes 
to be the PTM, is undermined by the introduction of a new competitor, even in the absence of any 
new data. If there are frameworks alternative to the PTM whereby we can describe, characterize and
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possibly explain the target explanandum, then, whatever the vices and virtues of the PTM, Shand 
(2014) has not given us an extra reason to believe that the PTM is correct.
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Appendix: Bronstein's Dream Game
White: David Bronstein
Black: David Bronstein
1. d4 Nf6 2. c4 e6 3. Nc3 Bb4 4. Bg5 h6 5. Bh4 Qe7 6. Nf3 d6 7. Qa4+ Nc6 8. d5!? ed5: 9. cd5: 
Qe4! 10. Nd2 Qh4: 11. dc6: 0-0 12. a3? Ng4 13. g3 Qf6 14. ab4:? Qf2:+ 15. Kd1 Ne3+ 16. Kc1 b5!
17. Qb3 Be6 18. Qa3 Qe1+ 19. Nd1 Qd1:+ checkmate.
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